Mauricio Suárez

MauricioSuarez

Mauricio Suárez
Prof. Titular Dpto. de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

https://ucm.academia.edu/MauricioSuárez

Mauricio Suárez (BSc. Astrophysics, Edinburgh, 1991; MSc., PhD. Philosophy, LSE, 1997) has held positions at Oxford, St. Andrews, Northwestern and Bristol Universities and is at present Associate Professor in Logic and Philosophy of Science at Complutense University of Madrid. He is also a honorary research associate at the Department of Science and Technology Studies, University College London; and since 1998 a long term affiliate and research associate at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS), London School of Economics. His main research interests lie in the philososophy of probability and causality, the history and philosophy of physics (particularly quantum mechanics), modelling and idealization, the aesthetics of scientific representation, and general epistemology and methodology of science, and he has published widely in all these areas. For over twenty years now he has been defending a broad kind of pragmatism that does not skew but rather aims to assimilate and appropriate for itself traditional realist notions such as representation, explanation, warrant, causation, disposition or propensity. He is thus known, amongst other views, for his critique of substantial conceptions of scientific representation and modelling, and his defence of a deflationary alternative view, the so called “inferential conception”. He has been Visiting Scholar at the University of Sydney (2003), and at Harvard University (2007, 2009, 2011). During 2011-12 he was Visiting Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy (School of Advanced Studies, London University), and during 2013-15 he was a Marie Curie senior research fellow at the same Institute, working on a project on propensities and statistics. He is the editor of four major book collections, including Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization (Routledge, 2009), and the author amongst many other publications of:

  • (2016) “Varieties of Misrepresentation and Homomorphism” (with Francesca Pero), European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 6 (1), pp. 71-90. (DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0741-1).
  • (2015c) “Representation in Science” in P. Humphreys, Ed., Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. (DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.25).
  • (2015b) “Scientific Representation, Denotation, and Fictional Entities”, in Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki (U. Maki et al., Eds.), Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 331-341.
  • (2015a) “Deflationary Representation, Inference, and Practice”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 49, pp. 36-47.
  • (2014a) “Scientific Representation”, Oxford Bibliographies Online, January 2014 http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0219.xml (http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/).
  • (2013c) “Fictions, Conditionals and Stellar Astrophysics”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 27 (3), October 2013, pp. 235-252.
  • (2012a) “The Ample Modeling Mind”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 43, 1, pp. 213-217.
  • (2011) * “Scientific Realism, the Galilean Strategy and Representation”, in W. González (Ed.), Scientific Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Amsterdam: Rodopi, vol. 101, pp. 269-293.
  • (2010b) * “Fictions, Inference, and Realism”, in J. Woods (ed.), Models and Fictions: New Essays, Munich: Georg Olms Verlag, pp. 225-245.
  • (2010a) “Scientific Representation”, Philosophy Compass, 5, 1, pp. 91-101.
  • (2009b) “Scientific Fictions as Rules of Inference”, in Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization, Routledge, pp. 158-198.
  • (2009a) “Fictions in Scientific Practice”, in Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealisation, Routledge, pp. 1-15.
  • (2008a) “Theories: Tools versus Models” (with Nancy Cartwright), Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39, pp. 62-81.
  • (2006) “On the Analogy Between Cognitive Representation and Truth” (with Albert Solé), Theoria, 55, pp. 39-48.
  • (2005a) “The Semantic View, Empirical Adequacy and Application”, Crítica, vol. 37, No. 109, pp. 29-63.
  • (2004f) “An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation”, Philosophy of Science, 71, 5, pp. 767-779.
  • (2003a) “Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 17, 3, October 2003, pp. 225-244.
  • (2001) * “Kinds of Models” (with Adam Morton), in P. Bates and M. Anderson (Eds.), Model Validation in Hydrological Science, John Wiley, pp. 11-21.
  • (1999c) “Theories, Models and Representations”, in L. Magnani, N. Nersessian and P. Thagard (Eds), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Plenum, New York, pp. 75-83.
  • (1999a) “The Role of Models in the Application of Scientific Theories: Epistemological Implications” in M. Morgan and M. Morrison (Eds.), Models as Mediating Instruments, Cambridge University Press, pp. 168-196.